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951 
LIFE BUT NOT LIBERTY? AN ASSESSMENT OF 
NONCAPITAL INDIGENT DEFENDANTS’ RIGHTS 
TO EXPERT ASSISTANCE UNDER THE  
AKE V. OKLAHOMA DOCTRINE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since 1973, at least eighty-five innocent people have been released from 
prison after being sentenced to death for crimes they did not commit.1 In 
1996, the National Institute of Justice documented twenty-seven wrongful 
convictions of sexual assault and murder in fourteen state cases during a 
twelve year period.2 The average prisoner in that study served seven years 
before release from prison.3 Legal studies that show similar erroneous 
convictions litter our crimial justice system.4 These statistics are startling and 
 
 
 1. Dirk Johnson, Illinois, Citing Faulty Verdicts, Bars Executions, N.Y. T IMES, Feb. 1, 2000, at 
A1.  
 2. EDWARD CONNERS ET AL. ,  CONVICTED BY JURIES,  EXONERATED BY SCIENCE:  CASE 
STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL 1 (1996) [hereinafter 
CONVICTED BY JURIES]. 
 3. Id. 
 4. See, e.g., Commentary by Peter Neufeld, Esq. and Barry Scheck, in CONVICTED BY JURIES, 
supra  note 2, at xxviii (describing the rate of error in original suspect identification that DNA evidence 
has revealed in sexual assault cases); Albert W. Alschuler, Preventive Pretrial Detention and the 
Failure of Interest-Balancing Approaches to Due Process, 85 MICH .  L.  REV. 510, 540 (1986) 
(discussing the high error rate in mental health professionals’ classifications of defendants as 
dangerous to society); James S. Liebman et al., Capital Attrition: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973-
1995, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1839, 1851-60 (2000) (stating statistics of various error rates in capital cases 
and the causes of those errors).  
 However, note that wrongful conviction rates are extremely difficult to quantify. According to 
Professor Welsch S. White: 
Empirical research relating to miscarriages of justice cannot, however, provide a confident 
estimate of the magnitude of erroneous convictions for at least two reasons. First, many wrongful 
convictions may remain undetected because, in the absence of special circumstances, no extensive 
investigation into a conviction’s factual accuracy is likely to occur. Second, as Leo and Ofshe’s 
statement relating to the “ground truth” suggests, when such an investigation does occur, it will 
not invariably result in a shared view as to whether the conviction was accurate. 
Welsch S. White, What Is an Involuntary Confession Now?, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 2001, 2033-34 
(1998). White explains that the first reason is primarily attributed to the fact that defendants who claim 
wrongful convictions generally do not have the resources to adequately research and present their 
claims. Id. at 2033 n.203. See also E. ROY CALVERT,  CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY  123 (1936) (“The improbability of a miscarriage of justice coming to light in a capital crime 
makes an investigation of the subject admittedly difficult.”).  
 For the second reason, White cites two studies that discuss the intricacies of police interrogation 
and their results on confessions of guilt. White, supra, at 2034 n.204. See also  Richard J. Ofshe & 
Richard A. Leo, The Social Psychology of Police Interrogation: The Theory and Classification of True 
and False Confessions, in 16 STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS AND SOCIETY  189 (1997); Richard A. Leo & 
Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages 
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unacceptable in a nation that prides itself on its just and humane treatment of 
all citizens through a judicial process that is supposed to seek out the truth. 
These statistics are even more shocking when combined with the fact that 
appeals from a denial of habeas corpus relief in noncapital cases succeed 
approximately seven percent of the time or less compared to nearly seventy-
three percent in capital cases.5 Thus, noncapital defendants face a potentially 
erroneous, unjust loss of liberty that is at least equal, if not greater, to that of 
capital defendants.6 
Most importantly, even if all of the studies and statistics showed that just 
one innocent person was wrongfully convicted of any crime, this solitary 
wrong would still be a tragedy. Only a wrongful conviction rate of zero is 
truly acceptable. Although numerous factors contribute to erroneous 
convictions,7 a prime source of error is clearly a defendant’s  lack of 
competent counsel and resources.8 All defendants are entitled to a compelling 
defense, and it is virtually impossible to assemble such a defense without 
access to the multitude of resources that are available to the prosecution.9 
 
 
of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1998). 
 5. IRA P. ROBBINS, TOWARD A MORE JUST AND EFFECTIVE SYSTEM OF REVIEW IN STATE 
DEATH PENALTY CASES 109 (1990). According to Robbins, this discrepancy is primarily due to the 
difference between the “preponderance of the evidence” standard used in noncapital cases and the 
“beyond a reasonable doubt” standard used in capital cases. 
 6. In a famous but controversial study, Professor James S. Liebman and his colleagues stated 
that the error rate in capital cases from 1973 through 1995 was sixty-eight percent compared to an 
error rate of fifteen percent in noncapital cases. See Liebman et al., supra note 4, at 1850, 1854. 
However, although this study has been proclaimed by many legal scholars as innovative and a great 
step in the investigation of error rates, many critize its ambiguity and its failure to account for the 
differences in review of capital cases. For an explanation of the inherent problems in the study’s 
figures and an argument that the error rates in capital and noncapital cases are in fact much more 
consistent than Liebman and his colleagues indicate, see Barry Latzer & James N.G. Cauthen, Capital 
Appeals Revisited, 84 JUDICATURE 64 (2000). For Liebman and his colleagues’ reply to Latzer and 
Cauthen’s criticism of their study and an explanation of the validity of their findings, see James S. 
Liebman et al., Death Matters: A Reply to Latzer and Cauthen, 84 JUDICATURE 72 (2000). 
 7. An influential study articulated the following reasons for wrongful convictions in order of 
prominence: erroneous eye-witness testimony, improper police officer conduct, prosecutorial 
misconduct, incompetent defense lawyers, shaded or lazy forensic science, racism or bigotry, and 
inadequate funding of defense activities. See generally JIM DWYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE : FIVE 
DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGFULLY CONVICTED 109-263 (2000). 
 8. For a discussion of inadequate resources and their role in erroneous convictions, see STAFF 
OF SUBCOMM. ON CIVIL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY , 103d 
CONG ., INNOCENCE AND THE DEATH PENALTY : ASSESSING THE DANGER OF MISTAKEN EXECUTIONS 
(Comm. Print 1994). 
 9. Although prosecutors’ offices do not typically have personnel advantages over the defense, 
they do have material resources that the defense does not. These resources include using the police as 
investigators, using grand jury subpoena power to force cooperation of witnesses, timing indictments, 
and consulting the government’s extensive forensic services and computer records. See Fred C. 
Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice? , 44 
VAND . L. REV. 45, 76 (1991). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss3/6
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This problem is exponentially increased in the case of indigent criminal 
defendants.10  
Because of this glaring barrier to fairness and justice, the U.S. 
Constitution includes numerous provisions that provide for the protection of 
indigent criminal defendants.11 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has 
interpreted these provisions generously, granting indigent criminal 
 
 
  
 By contrast, the defense may be under the burden of an overwhelming caseload, which 
prosecutors generally do not suffer. Id. at 77. Moreover, the defense is under the time constraints 
imposed by the prosecutors’ timing of the indictment. Id.  
 In the expert assistance context, the prosecution particularly enjoys the advantage of the 
government’s ability to afford the top experts. See id. at 78.  In the case of governmental agency 
laboratories, governments have nearly exclusive access to the experts in question. Id. One former 
United States Attorney General stated, “I know of no prosecutor who thinks that, in this balance [of 
resources relating to] the advocate’s art, [s]he is the loser.” Id. at 76 (alteration in original).  
 10. For a description of the scarcity of resources available to counselors of indigent criminal 
defendants, see STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON CIVIL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF HOUSE COMM. ON 
THE JUDICIARY, 103d CONG., supra note 8. See also White, supra note 4. 
 11. The provisions of the Constitution that are most frequently relied upon for this proposition 
include the Sixth Amendment, the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
 The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution provides in relevant part that “[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.” 
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  
 Additionally, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment states that no person may “be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. Similarly, 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment extends this prohibition to the actions of the 
States by instructing that no State shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.   
 Finally, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o State shall 
. . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. 
XIV. The Court’s equal protection doctrine requires that the government apply heightened scrutiny 
only when the action discriminates against an individual who is part of a group that, in addition to 
having other necessary characteristics, is defined by an immutable characteristic. Generally, analysis 
of indigent citizen’s issues under the Equal Protection Clause is limited by this requirement. See City 
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). Because our political system 
revolves around the engrained notion that citizens can change their financial situation through hard 
work and diligence, financial status is not considered an immutable trait. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. 
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 22 (1973). Therefore, the Court generally gives much deference to 
governmental actions treating citizens differently based on their financial status. See id. However, the 
Court has developed the “fundamental interest equal protection” doctrine under which the Court 
strictly scrutinizes governmental actions that discriminate against any class of persons in a manner that 
affects an individual interest. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 382-83 (1971); Harper v. 
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966). Governmental action that excludes the poor from 
the judicial system are subject to this fundamental interest equal protection analysis. See, e.g., Douglas 
v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963). 
 Often it is unclear on which of these provisions the Court relies in its right to access decisions 
because the principles behind them are closely tied. For an in depth discussion of the interrelation of 
these four provisions in right to access case law, see JOHN E. NOWAK &  RONALD D. ROTUNDA, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.41 (2000). For examples of the Court’s practical applications of these 
provisions, see infra notes 22-29.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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defendants an increasingly broader range of rights.12 In 1985, this “right to 
access” line of cases culminated in Ake v. Oklahoma,13 in which the Court 
extended the principles governing the provision of defenses for indigent 
criminal defendants as they pertain to expert witnesses,14 provided that the 
defendant satisfies the requisite three-part balancing test and that the 
requested assistance is integral to his defense.15  
Specifically, the Supreme Court in Ake defined its test in the context of a 
capital defendant’s request for a psychiatric expert to substantiate his insanity 
plea.16 However, the Court did not define the scope of cases to which its 
three-part test should apply. Since Ake, lower federal and state courts have 
struggled with the confines of the holding in many contexts,17 generating 
great disparities among indigent defendants’ right to expert assistance among 
the jurisdictions. Additionally, state assistance statutes differ significantly in 
 
 
 12. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 13. 470 U.S. 68 (1985). 
 14. A prime reason that defendants seek their own expert assistance is to respond to the 
prosecutor’s expert testimony. See United States v. Sloan, 776 F.2d 926, 929 (1985). See also  Ellen E. 
Deason, Court-Appointed Expert Witnesses: Scientific Positivism Meets Bias and Deference, 77 OR. L. 
REV. 59 (1998). Although this Note contemplates experts other than psychological experts, the dangers 
of relying on the prosecution’s psychological expert is particularly great. See discussion infra notes 17-
19. In the context of the insanity defense, relying on the prosecution’s expert is particularly 
problematic for full fairness because the Court has determined that there is no constitutional mandate 
that the defendant’s counsel be present at the psychiatric examination. See Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 
U.S. 402, 424-25 (1987). In Buchanan, the Court held that a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to 
consultation is fulfilled as long as counsel is “informed about the scope and nature of the proceeding” 
and is aware “of the possible uses to which petitioner’s statements in the proceeding could be put” and 
thus need not be present at the examination. Id. Thus, in addition to being forced to rely on the expert’s 
determination of the defendant’s mental state, in some circumstances, defense counsel will not be able 
to formulate its own interpretation of the competency evaluation. However, note that the “gatekeeping 
responsibility” of the trial judge that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 imposes alleviates this strain on the 
defense. See FED. R. EVID. 702. This duty has been fully defined by the Court in Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.  and requires that the judge ensure the reliability of any expert provided by 
the government. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 15. When a requested expert is crucial to an indigent criminal defendant’s defense, balancing the 
following three factors is necessary to determine whether the requested assistance is constitutionally 
mandated: the private interest at issue, the government’s interest at issue, and the probable value that 
the assistance will yield including consideration of the possible result if the assistance is not provided. 
For a discussion of Ake and the balancing test, see discussion  infra Part II.B.  
 16. 470 U.S. at 74. 
 17. Originally, courts disagreed about Ake’s application to specific experts, including DNA 
experts, jury experts, and narcotics experts to name just a few. Although most courts now apply Ake to 
these classic experts, disputes still arise over the inclusion of less conventional experts. Furthermore, a 
few courts have extended the Ake standard to civil cases. These application issues are timely and 
important but beyond the scope of this Note. For an extensive discussion of Ake’s expansion in other 
contexts, see John Devlin, Genetics and Justice: An Indigent Defendant’s Right to DNA Expert 
Assistance, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 395; David Medine, The Constitutional Right to Expert Assistance 
for Indigents in Civil Cases, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 281 (1990); A. Michell Willis, Nonpsychiatric Expert 
Assistance and the Requisite Showing of Need: A Catch-22 in the Post-Ake Criminal Justice System , 
37 EMORY  L.J. 995 (1988). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss3/6
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the enumerated situations in which the statutes grant access to expert 
assistance.18  
Although these courts and statutes are inconsistent in their application of 
the Ake standard in many contexts, this Note will focus on the disparities 
between those courts and statutes that limit Ake to capital cases and those that 
extend Ake to noncapital cases. This Note argues that the Ake three-part test 
applies to indigent criminal defendants accused of noncapital, as well as 
capital, crimes.19 Part II describes the historical development of the “right to 
access” principles and explains the current split in judicial jurisdictions and 
state statutes over Ake’s application to noncapital cases. Part III details the 
constitutional and practical rationales that favor extending the Ake standard 
to noncapital cases. Finally, Part IV proposes a uniform common law stance 
on Ake’s application to noncapital indigent defendants and encourages state 
legislatures to do the same with their state assistance statutes.20  
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONTROVERSY 
A. “Right to Access” Principles Leading Up to Ake 
The notion that all citizens have access to our nation’s courts is a well-
recognized principle, and the Supreme Court has repeatedly examined the 
breadth of this right in many circumstances.21 Justice Hugo Black’s oft-
quoted declaration in Griffin v. Illinois that “[t]here can be no equal justice 
where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has” 
 
 
 18. See infra Part II.C.  
 19. In practice, when a psychiatrist, as opposed to other kinds of experts, is necessary for an 
indigent defendant’s defense, the question of Ake’s extension to noncapital cases might not arise 
frequently because “‘[i]nsanity pleas are almost exclusively raised in cases of homicide or other capital 
offenses.’” John M. West, Expert Services and the Indigent Criminal Defendant: The Constitutional 
Mandate of Ake v. Oklahoma, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1326, 1343 n.113 (1986) (quoting Gardner, The Myth 
of the Impartial Psychiatric Expert, 2 LAW & P SYCHOL. REV. 99, 104 (1976)). This situation derives 
from the fact that a plea of insanity is “‘tantamount to an admission’ of commission of the act, and 
because a successful insanity defense usually results in indeterminate confinement.” Id. See also 
STEVEN R. KIERSH,  HOW TO USE AND COMBAT EXPERTS IN FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY CASES 1 
(2000). Therefore, although the capital versus noncapital distinction is important in the context of 
expert psychiatric assistance, it is a particularly important issue in the wake of increasing extension of 
the Ake standard to other types of expert assistance. 
 20. Although other commentators have addressed Ake’s scope in other contexts, very few have 
addressed the noncapital scope issue. See supra  note 17. Those commentators that have addressed this 
issue did so shortly after the Ake decision and before the vast majority of the cases giving rise to the 
controversy. See infra Part II.C. Finally, this Note will focus on the role of the state assistance statutes 
in creating and maintaining the discrepancies of Ake’s application and proposes a unification of these 
statutes in addition to state and federal common law. See infra notes 90-93.  
 21. See infra  notes 22-29. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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has become the hallmark of the Supreme Court’s right to access doctrine.22 
Griffin was the first case to examine an indigent criminal defendant’s right to 
access. The case established that states must provide an indigent defendant a 
free copy of their trial transcript upon the right to appeal when such transcript 
is necessary for his appeal.23 Since Griffin , the Court, relying on an array of 
constitutional principles, has enforced an indigent criminal defendant’s right 
to counsel for state as well as federal trials,24 right to assistance of counsel on 
appeal,25 right to counsel for misdemeanors,26 right to waived filing fees,27 
right to assistance of counsel in probation revocation hearings,28 and right to 
access after imprisonment.29 
 
 
 22. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956). 
 23. See id. 
 24. Pursuant to the Sixth Amendment, the Court has frequently expressed that the “right to be 
heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by 
counsel.” Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932). In Gideon v. Wainright, the Court held that 
States, as well as the federal government, must provide counsel for every indigent criminal defendant 
accused of a felony. 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963).  
 25. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963). Ross v. Moffitt subsequently limited 
this rule to indigent defendants’ first appeal as of right, stating that the government is not required to 
appoint counsel for discretionary appeals. 417 U.S. 600, 615-16 (1974). 
 26. In Argersinger v. Hamlin , the Court held that the government must provide counsel to any 
indigent criminal defendant charged with a crime that could result in imprisonment and that such 
defendants could not stand trial without such assistance. 407 U.S. 25, 30-31 (1972). However, the 
Court revised this rule in Scott v. Illinois, requiring only that governments offer assistance to such 
defendants. 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979). 
 27. See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942). In Boddie v. Connecticut, the Court applied 
this waiver principle to a filing fee for a divorce proceeding. 401 U.S. 371, 382-83 (1971). This waiver 
principle has not been universally applied to other civil matters. See United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 
434, 450 (1973) (holding that the government is not required to waive the filing fee for indigent 
criminal defendants in bankruptcy proceedings); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 661 (1973) 
(holding that the government is not required to waive filing fees for judicial review of adverse welfare 
decisions). This difference in treatment between these civil matters is primarily due to the fact that 
marriage is considered a “fundamental right” under the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence, and the 
inability to afford a divorce infringes on this right. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). See 
also Erwin Chemerinsky, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 740-41 (1997). 
 28. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973); Mempa v. Rhay , 389 U.S. 128, 137 
(1967). 
 29. However, the Court has sent conflicting messages on this issue. In the well-known Bounds v. 
Smith  case, the Court instructed that prisons were to provide law libraries and supplies to in mates for 
research to collaterally attack their convictions. 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1974). However, in Pennsylvania 
v. Finley, the Court stated, “We have never held that prisoners have a constitutional right to counsel 
when mounting collateral attacks upon their convictions and we decline to so hold today.” 481 U.S. 
551, 555 (1987) (citations omitted).  
 Furthermore, the Court held in Murray v. Giarratano that the government is not required to 
provide indigent defendants on death row with free counsel to pursue collateral attacks on their 
convictions and sentences. 492 U.S. 1, 10 (1989). Finally, in a limited return to Bounds in Lewis v. 
Casey, the Court held that an indigent prisoner must show that the current state of his prison’s facilities 
had caused “‘actual prejudice with respect to contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability 
to meet a filing deadline or to present a claim.’” 518 U.S. 343, 348 (1996).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss3/6
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Additionally, Congress has taken an active role in defining indigent 
criminal defendants’ rights in federal court cases. The Criminal Justice Act of 
1964 provides in part that federal indigent criminal defendants are entitled to 
“investigative, expert or other services necessary for adequate 
representation.”30  
B. Explanation of Ake v. Oklahoma 
In Ake, the Supreme Court held that an indigent defendant has a right to a 
psychiatric expert’s assistance if his or her sanity will be a “significant 
factor” at trial.31 The state charged Glen Burke Ake with murdering a couple 
and wounding their two children with the intent to kill.32 Because Ake’s 
behavior at his arraignment was so bizarre,33 the trial judge ordered a 
psychiatric examination sua sponte.34 The State’s examining psychiatrist 
found him incompetent to stand trial and committed him to a state mental 
hospital.35 Soon after, however, the hospital’s chief forensic psychiatrist 
informed the court that Ake was now competent to stand trial so long as he 
 
 
 30. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(6)(e)(1) (1994). According to the Act, its provision of “counsel and 
investigative, expert, and other services necessary for adequate representation” shall apply to “any 
financially eligible person” who, among other possible scenarios, has been charged with a felony or 
Class A misdemeanor. Id. at § 3006A(a). Moreover, the Act specifically allows the United States 
magistrate or the court, when the interest of justice so requires, to provide the same services to any 
financially eligible person who is either charged with a Class B or C misdemeanor or seeks relief 
under Title 28. Id.  
 However, despite this broad application to noncapital indigent defendants, the Act does not 
answer all issues of expert assistance on the federal criminal level. The Ake test addresses the 
provision of such assistance in situations that the Act does not address. Most importantly, the Ake 
decision examines constitutional claims on a wide variety of expert assistance issues, including 
evaluating claims for the unconstitutional denial of the requested expert. Additionally, unlike Ake’s 
application at all stages of trial, at least one federal circuit has held that the Act only applies to pretrial 
ex parte proceedings. See United States v. Osoba, 213 F.3d 913 (6th Cir. 2000). Finally, unlike Ake, 
the Act places a financial cap of $300 on expert assistance. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1994). Therefore, in 
addition to Ake’s importance on the state level, its test is crucial on the federal level despite the Act’s 
apparent coverage of the expert assistance issue. 
 31. 470 U.S. at 83. 
 32. Id. at 70. While looking for a suitable house to burglarize, appellant and an accomplice 
entered the victims’ home under the pretense that they were lost and needed directions. Ake v. State, 
663 P.2d 1, 4 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983), rev’d sub. nom., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985). The 
pair held the family at gunpoint, bound and gagged them, attempted to rape the twelve-year-old 
daughter, and ransacked the family’s home before shooting them. Id. 
 33. Ake’s behavior included claiming to be the “‘sword of vengeance’ of the Lord and that he 
[would] sit at the left hand of God in heaven.” 470 U.S. at 71 (quoting the examining psychiatrist’s 
report). Ake was expelled from his arraignment for his disruptive behavior. 663 P.2d at 5. Ake also 
displayed similarly in appropriate behavior during prearraignment incidents at the jail. 470 U.S. at 71. 
 34. 470 U.S. at 71.  
 35. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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was kept heavily medicated.36  
Once the trial court declared Ake competent to stand trial, Ake’s 
appointed counsel informed the court that he would present an insanity 
defense and requested, presumably due to Ake’s indigency, that the court 
provide the defendant with a psychiatrist for the purpose of assessing his 
sanity at the time of the offense.37 The trial judge refused the request.38 
Primarily because of the lack of expert evidence sufficient to meet the burden 
of the insanity defense, the jury found Ake guilty and sentenced him to 
death.39 The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals upheld the conviction and 
sentence, rejecting the defense counsel’s argument that the State’s refusal to 
provide Ake with access to a psychiatric expert warranted reversal.40  
The Supreme Court applied a refinement of the general test developed in 
Mathews v. Eldridge41 for determining the “specific dictates of due 
process.”42 According to the Ake Court, three factors are relevant to 
determining whether a psychiatrist is generally important enough to an 
indigent defendant’s defense to require the government to provide a 
psychiatric expert.43 The Court stated: 
The first [factor] is the private interest that will be affected by the 
action of the State. The second is the governmental interest that will be 
 
 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 72. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 72-73. 
 40. 663 P.2d at 6. 
 41. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). In Mathews, the Court established the three-part balancing test by 
which most procedural due process claims are evaluated. The formula balances the private interests 
affected by the challenged procedure, the risk of error in the determination, and the governmental 
interests supporting the continued use of t he challenged procedure. Id. at 335. 
 The Court has only used the Mathews test twice in the criminal procedure context. In addition to 
Ake, the Court applied the test in United States v. Raddatz.  447 U.S. 667, 680 (1980) (holding that a 
provision of the Federal Magistrates Act allowing magistrates to make findings and recommendations 
on motions to suppress evidence did not violate a defendant’s due process rights). For a general 
discussion of the Mathews test and the appropriateness of the Ake Court’s refin ement, see Charles H. 
Koch, A Community of Interest in the Due Process Calculus, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 635, 657 (2000). 
 Many lower courts have refused to apply the Mathews test in anything but its traditional 
administrative law context. See, e.g., State v. Wagner, 982 P.2d 270, 273 (Ariz. 1999). Lower courts 
adhering to this limited application attribute their views to the Court’s limited use of the Mathews test 
in other contexts and to the Court’s refusal to further extend the test to evaluate the constitutionality of 
state criminal statutes in Medina v. California . 505 U.S. 437, 444 (1992). For an extensive discussion 
of the traditional use of the Mathews test and the reasons for its limited application, see Paul Bender et 
al., The Supreme Court of Arizona: Its 1998-99 Decisions, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 18-31 (2000). Despite 
this discussion and the Court’s seeming stray from its traditional use of the Mathews Due Process test, 
the Ake decision remains the well-established doctrine of the Court in the expert assistance context. 
 42. 424 U.S. at 335. 
 43. 470 U.S. at 77. 
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affected if the safeguard is to be provided. The third is the probable 
value of the additional or substitute procedural safeguards that are 
sought, and the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the affected interest 
if those safeguards are not provided.44  
The Court applied these factors to psychiatric aid in general45 and held 
that, “when a defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that his sanity at the 
time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial, the State must, at a 
minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist.”46 The 
Court relied primarily on the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause47 
and stated that its holding was consistent with “the belief that justice cannot 
be equal where, simply as a result of his poverty, a defendant is denied the 
opportunity to participate meaningfully in a judicial proceeding in which his 
liberty is at stake.”48 Finally, the Court applied its holding to Ake’s case and 
found that he had adequately demonstrated that his mental state at the time of 
 
 
 44. Id. 
 45. When applying the factors, the Court found that first “[t]he private interest in the accuracy of 
a criminal proceeding that places an individual’s life or liberty at risk is almost uniquely  compelling 
. . . . The interest of the individual in the outcome of the State’s effort to overcome the presumption of 
innocence is obvious and weighs heavily in our analysis.” Id. at 78. Second, in regard to the State’s 
interest, the Court was unpersuaded by the State’s argument that to provide indigent defendants with 
psychiatric assistance would result in a “staggering burden to the State.” Id. According to the Court, 
many states provide such assistance without finding the financial burden so great, especially when the 
state’s obligation is limited to providing one competent psychiatrist as the Court recognizes the 
obligation to entail. Id. at 78-79. Further, unlike private litigants, “a State may not legitimately assert 
an interest in maintenance of a st rategic advantage over the defense, if the result of that advantage is to 
cast a pall on the accuracy of the verdict obtained.” Id. at 79. Third, the Court found that the probable 
value of psychiatric assistance to the defense is high and that the risk of error is great when only the 
State has access to such assistance. Id. at 79-81. The defendant’s psychiatric expert is “crucial to the 
defendant’s ability to marshal his defense” by gathering facts through examination and interview of 
the defendant, by analyzing the information to draw plausible conclusions about the defendant’s 
mental condition and its effects on his behavior at the time in question, by aiding the lead counsel in 
his cross-examination of the State’s psychiatric witness, and by translating medical diagnosis. Id. at 
80.  
 46. Id. at 83. Thus, the Court expounded a general legal requirement so long as the factual 
requirement of “significant factor” at trial is met, and the latter requirement is only applicable when 
Ake is applied to psychiatric experts.  
 47. The Court stated that its holding was “grounded in significant part on the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s due process guarantee of fundamental fairness.” Id. at 76. After much discussion of the 
demands of Due Process in Ake’s case, the Court held that  “the denial of that assistance deprived 
[Ake] of due process.” Id. at 86-87.  
 The Court did not focus on other Constitutional provisions in its opinion, although it referred to 
prior right to access cases that had relied on Equal Protection and Sixth Amendment principles. In 
explanation, the Court instructed, “Because we conclude that the Due Process Clause guaranteed to 
Ake the assistance he requested and was denied, we have no occasion to consider the applicability of 
the Equal Protection Clause, or the Sixth Amendment, in this context.” Id. at 87 n.13. 
 48. Id. at 76. 
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the offenses was a significant factor at trial.49 Therefore, the Court held that 
Ake was entitled to the assistance of a psychiatric expert and consequently, 
the denial of such assistance at trial had deprived him of due process.50 
C. The Post-Ake Scope Controversy 
1. Federal Courts 
Since Ake, very few federal circuit courts of appeal have addressed the 
application of the Ake rule51—the general three-part test coupled with the 
“significant factor” requirement—to noncapital cases.52 Even those circuits 
that have extended the test to noncapital cases have generally done so with an 
assumption of the Ake Court’s intent but without extensively evaluating the 
issue.53  
Little v. Armontrout54 has become the leading case cited by proponents of 
an extension of the Ake standard to noncapital cases.55 In Little, the Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals applied the Ake test to a claim for expert assistance 
involving a petition for writ of habeas corpus following a conviction for 
burglary and rape.56 The Little  court performed virtually the only true 
 
 
 49. The Court found that the presentation of the following evidence sustained Ake’s burden of 
demonstrating that his sanity was a significant factor in his defense: the trial court was on notice that 
Ake’s mental state at the time of offense was to be a substantial factor in his defense; Ake’s behavior 
at the arraignment was so bizarre as to prompt the trial judge to have him examined for competency 
sua sponte; a state psychiatrist found him incompetent to stand trial and suggested that Ake be 
committed; he was only later found to be competent on the condition that he be sedated with large 
doses of medication; the examining psychiatrist indicated that his mental illness might have begun 
years before the crime at issue; and Oklahoma recognizes a defense of insanity for which the defense 
has the initial burden. Id. at 86. Further, Ake’s future threat to society was a significant factor at the 
sentencing phase due to the state psychiatrist’s test imony that his illness posed a threat of continuing 
violence which Oklahoma recognizes as an aggravating factor in its capital sentencing scheme. Id. 
(citing OKLA . STAT. T IT. 21, § 701.12(7) (1981)). 
 50. Ake, 470 U.S. at 86-87. 
 51. This lack of application of the Ake constitutional test is primarily attributable to the fact that 
the Criminal Justice Act provides expert assistance to federal criminal defendants in many situations. 
See supra note 30. 
 52. The First, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have applied the Ake 
test, but only the Eighth Circuit has analyzed the issue of its application to noncapital cases at length. 
 53. See infra  notes 59-64 and accompanying text. 
 54. 835 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1987).  
 55. See Kordenbrock v. Scroggy, 919 F.2d 1091, 1104 (6th Cir. 1990) (relying on the Little 
court’s analysis and quoting Little for the proposition that “‘[t]he question in each case must be not 
what field of science or expert knowledge is involved, but rather how important the scientific issue is 
in the case, and much help a defense expert could have given.’”). See also Starr v. Lockhart, 23 F.3d 
1280, 1287 (8th Cir. 1994); Husske v. Commonwealth, 448 S.E.2d 331, 335-36 (Va. Ct. App. 1994). 
This reliance on Little is primarily due to the fact that the case is the clearest and most extensive 
analysis at the court of appeals level. See supra note 57. 
 56. 835 F.2d 1240. 
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analysis, albeit brief, of the scope of the Ake test at the federal level57 and 
held that it did not draw a decisive line for due-process purposes between 
capital and noncapital cases.58 The Eight Circuit stated that the defendant’s 
interest in avoiding a prison term outweighed the state’s interest in avoiding 
the relatively small expenditure on expert assistance.59 
However, the Little court stated that for Ake to ensure the requested expert 
assistance, “the defendant must show a reasonable probability that an expert 
would aid in his defense, and that denial of expert assistance would result in 
an unfair trial.”60 Therefore, after the application of the Ake test, the court 
granted the defendant’s request for assistance.61 
In addition to the Eighth Circuit, the First,62 Fifth,63 Sixth,64 Seventh,65 
Tenth,66 and Eleventh67 Circuits have applied the Ake test in noncapital cases. 
 
 
 57. Although other circuit courts of appeal have addressed the issue to a moderate degree, a 
careful search of each jurisdiction reveals that the Little court provided the most thorough analysis of 
the scope issue. See supra  notes 59-69. 
 58. Id. at 243.  
 59. Id. at 1243-44. Thus, the Eighth Circuit was actually applying the balancing test at the same 
moment that it was deciding whether the test applied to noncapital cases.  
 60. Id. at 1244. This standard and Ake’s application to noncapital cases are now well-established 
principles in the Eighth Circuit. See Williams v. Iowa, 714 F.3d 1244, 1996 WL 15473 (8th Cir. Jan 
17, 1996) (unpublished table decision) (relying on Little to apply the Ake test to a habeas corpus 
petition from a life sentence for first degree murder); United States v. Spotted War Bonnet, 882 F.2d 
1360, 1374 (8th Cir. 1989) (relying on Little to apply the Ake test to a trial for carnal knowledge and 
incest), vacated on other grounds by 497 U.S. 1021 (1990). 
 61. 835 F.2d at 1245. 
 62. See Bundy v. Wilson, 815 F.2d 125, 134 (1st Cir. 1987) (applying the Ake test in case 
involving petition for habeas corpus following robbery conviction). 
 63. See United States v. Williams, 998 F.2d 258, 264 (5th Cir. 1993) (applying the Ake standard 
to rape case); Williams v. Collins,  989 F.2d 841, 844-46 (5th Cir. 1993) (applying the Ake standard to 
kidnapping case); Volanty v. Lynaugh, 874 F.2d 243, 244-46 (5th Cir. 1989) (applying the Ake 
standard in robbery case); Volson v. Blackburn, 794 F.2d 173, 176 (5th Cir. 1986) (applying the Ake 
standard to rape case). 
 64. See Crockett v. Noles, 904 F.2d 706, 1990 WL 79213 (6th Cir. June 12, 1990) (unpublished 
table decision) (applying the Ake three-part test to a case involving robbery and assault with the intent 
to kill). See also Laker v. Kindt, 986 F.2d 1421, 1993 WL 40847 (6th Cir. Feb. 17, 1993) (unpublished 
table decision) (citing Ake in a robbery case for the proposition that when a defendant’s “sanity at the 
time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial, the State must, at a minimum, assure the 
defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in 
evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense”). Note, however, that these decisions are 
unpublished opinions and are, therefore, not a mandatory demonstration of the court’s stance on the 
capital versus noncapital distinction. 
 65. However, the only evidence of the Seventh Circuit’s position is its application of the general 
Ake principles, but not the three-part test itself, to a robbery case in United States v. Fazzini. 871 F.2d 
635, 637-38 (7th Cir. 1989). 
 66. The Tenth Circuit has consistently applied the Ake three-part test on the assumption that 
Ake’s scope reaches noncapital cases, although it has not done extensive analysis of the issue. See 
United States v. Gianetta , 139 F.3d 913, 1998 WL 67305 (10th Cir. Feb. 18, 1998) (unpublished table 
decision) (applying the Ake test but denying an indigent defendant access to a DNA expert in robbery 
case); United States v. Kennedy, 64 F.3d 1465, 1473 (10th Cir. 1995) (applying the Ake test but 
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Although dicta in many Ninth Circuit decisions indicate that Ake may apply 
to noncapital cases,68 it has never actually applied the three-part test to a 
noncapital case because it has always dismissed applicable defendants’ 
claims on other grounds.69 The Second,70 Third,71 Fourth,72 and District of 
 
 
denying an indigent defendant access to additional paralegals, airfare, and an accounting firm in 
racketeering, money laundering, and mail fraud case); United States v. Crews, 781 F.2d 826, 833 (10th 
Cir. 1986) (granting an indigent defendant charged with threatening the President’s life access to 
psychiatric expert to aid insanity defense); United States v. Sloan, 776 F.2d 926, 929 (10th Cir. 1985) 
(granting psychiatric expert to aid insanity defense in kidnapping case).  
 67. See Cowley v. Stricklin, 929 F.2d 640, 643 (11th Cir. 1991) (applying the Ake test and 
granting an indigent defendant access to psychiatric expert when insanity defense was raised in sexual 
assault case). 
 68. In United States v. George , in which the government charged an indigent defendant with 
robbery, the Ninth Circuit stated, “Even assuming that Ake applies to noncapital cases, George does 
not argue that his mental condition would be a ‘significant factor’ in the proceeding.” 85 F.3d 1433, 
1438 (9th Cir. 1996). Similarly, in United States v. Hand, the Ninth Circuit held that even if Ake 
applied to the illegal weapons case at issue, the defendant’s requested motion for a psychiatric expert 
was properly denied because he “failed to make the requisite threshold showing that his mental 
condition would be a ‘significant factor’ in the criminal proceeding.” 61 F.3d 913, 1995 WL 430568 
(9th Cir. July 20, 1995) (unpublished table decision). But see United States v. Hunter, 120 F.3d 269, 
1997 WL 409572, at **1 n.1 (9th Cir. July 17, 1997) (unpublished table decision) (“To the extent 
Hunter relies on Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), the reliance is misplaced. Ake [sic] involved an 
indigent defendant in a capital case who required medical assistance in order to present an insanity 
defense at trial. Here, Hunter’s mental health became an issue at sentencing.”). 
 69. The George court did not reach the scope issue because the defendants had not made the 
primary showing that the requested expert was to be an integral part of his defense at trial. George, 85 
F.3d at 1438. 
 70. Although the Second Circuit has not resolved this controversy and has never applied the Ake 
three-part test to a noncapital case, dicta in two of its decisions indicate that it may be willing to apply 
Ake in such cases. In Tyson v. Keane an indigent defendant charged with rape requested a voice expert, 
but the court denied the request and distinguished Ake on very narrow bases, such as the difference in 
the experts requested. 159 F.3d 732, 737-38 (2d Cir. 1998). However, the Tyson court did not 
distinguish the case from Ake on the basis of the capital versus noncapital distinction. Id. Further, 
despite the fact that the Second Circuit found that Ake was inapplicable, it implicitly performed the 
“need” aspect of the three-part test in its analysis. Id. Similarly, in United States v. Smith , the Second 
Circuit did not apply the Ake test and distinguished the case from Ake on the very narrow ground that 
in Smith , “the psychiatric testimony involved concerns the credibility of Smith’s duress claim, rather 
than testimony as to Smith’s capacity to form the intent necessary to commit a crime [as in Ake].” 987 
F.2d 888, 891 n.4 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 71. This determination was reached after extensive research of the Third Circuit’s expert 
assistance doctrine and its use of Ake. 
 72. Like the Second Circuit, the Fourth Circuit has not addressed the scope issue and has not 
applied the Ake test to a noncapital case. In dicta, however, it has indicated a willingness to do so. In 
United States v. Singleton the Fourth Circuit evaluated an advisory counsel issue, an issue related to a 
request for expert assistance to which Ake does not apply. 107 F.3d 1091, 1103 (4th Cir. 1997). The 
court stated “that litigants with financial resources may hire any number of experts.” Id. at 1103 n.10. 
Similarly, in Hooper v. Garraghy, an indigent defendant was charged with murder, malicious 
wounding, and using a firearm in the commission of a felony. 845 F.2d 471, 472 (4th Cir. 1988). The 
Fourth Circuit addressed the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel due, among other malfeasances, 
to the counselors’ failure to request a psychiatric expert. The Fourth Circuit stated that “[w]hen an 
indigent defendant’s sanity will be a significant issue at trial, the defendant is entitled to have the 
services of a psychiatrist to aid in evaluation and preparation of an insanity defense.” Id. at 474 n.3. 
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Columbia 73 Circuits have not addressed the issue.  
Finally, there are a few criminal procedures that distinguish between 
capital and noncapital defendants.74 However, these differences are primarily 
important at three phases of a criminal trial: voir dire,75 determining statutory 
death eligibility,76 and sentencing.77  
2. State Courts 
State courts have widely diverged on the issue of Ake’s scope much more 
than federal courts, primarily because state courts deal with noncapital 
criminal cases more frequently than federal courts and have thus confronted 
the issue more often.78 Historically, Alabama has been the most fervent 
supporter of the capital/noncapital distinction,79 refusing to apply Ake to 
 
 
 73. Like the Third Circuit, this determination was reached after extensive research of the District 
of Columbia Circuit’s expert assistance doctrine and its use of Ake.  
 74. Opponents of Ake’s expansion to noncapital cases point to a large body of Eighth 
Amendment law that follows the “death is different” theory and emphasizes the need for greater 
reliability in capital cases. See Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 262-63 (1988) (Marshall, J., 
concurring); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 704 (1984) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part); California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99 (1983); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 
349, 357 (1977); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).  
 However, these cases concern Eighth Amendment “cruel and unusual punishment” principles 
rather than the constitutional principles guiding indigent defendants’ rights cases. Moreover, in the 
vast collection of criminal procedure involving constitutional questions, this narrow area distin guishes 
between capital and noncapital cases and, therefore, fulfills an exception to the general rule of criminal 
procedure rather than an example of it. For an extensive discussion of the “death is different” theory 
and case law, see David McCord, Is Death “Different” for Purposes of Harmless Error Analysis? 
Should It Be?: An Assessment of United States and Louisiana Supreme Court Case Law, 59 LA. L. 
REV. 1105 (1999). 
 75. See Wainright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985) (establishing the test that allows defendants 
to exclude potential jurors who are overly zealous about capital punishment). 
 76. This inquiry encompasses the determination of which criminal offenses courts appropriately 
punish by death, including prohibitions on mandatory death for certain offenses.  
 77. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 193-95 (1976); Ramos, 463 U.S. at 998-99.  
 78. For a discussion of the role of state courts in criminal procedure compared with that of 
federal courts, see Judith S. Kaye, “Year in Review” Shows Court of Appeals Continuing Its Great 
Traditions, 42 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 331, 331 (1998) (noting that state courts determine roughly ninety-
eight percent of nation’s litigation); Ellen A. Peters, Capacity and Respect: A Perspective on the 
Historic Role of the State Courts in the Federal System , 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1065, 1083-84 (1998) 
(describing the increasingly active role of state courts and the importance of federalism in creating that 
role); Michael Wells, Is Disparity a Problem?, 22 GA. L. REV. 283, 294 (1988) (describing notions of 
equity and comity, in addition to federalism, as reasons for the powerful role of state courts in criminal 
cases). 
 An additional reason that state courts have addressed the Ake scope issue more than federal courts 
is that the Criminal Justice Act applies to many expert assistance issues on the federal level such that 
Ake claims are brought infrequently. See supra note 51. 
 79. Although other states have addressed the scope issue to a moderate extent and some states 
formerly adhered to the limited application view, careful research of each state’s modern common law 
reveals that Alabama’s language is the strongest, its analysis the most extensive, and its view the most 
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noncapital cases.80 Similarly, other states have openly doubted its application 
to noncapital cases.81 Tennessee,82 Texas,83 and Virginia,84 on the other hand, 
have extensively analyzed the issue and have extended Ake to noncapital 
cases. Yet other states have assumed Ake’s scope without stating the 
justifications for their decisions.85 Although many state courts have not 
addressed the extension of the Ake test to noncapital cases, they have either 
applied the Ake test very strictly, limiting it to factually similar cases,86 or 
applied the test very liberally to a broad range of factual situations, such as to 
claims of different requests for experts other than psychiatric experts or 
claims for experts at stages of trial beyond sentencing.87 A final common 
 
 
consistent throughout the history of this scope issue. See supra notes 80-88. 
 80. In Isom v. State the Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama stated that “it is to be noted that 
Ake does not reach noncapital cases.” 488 So. 2d 12, 13 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986). This case has become 
a staple in Alabama criminal common law. See Marlow v. State, 538 So. 2d 804, 807 (Ala. Crim. App. 
1988) (“[T]he authority upon which the appellant bases his argument [Ake] does not apply in non-
capital cases.”); Wisdom v. State, 515 So. 2d 730, 734 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987) (stating that “Wisdom 
was not entitled to a private psychiatrist” in a burglary and sodomy case); Bradford v. State, 512 So. 
2d 134, 135 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987) (“‘Ake does not reach noncapital cases.’”). But see Russell v. 
State, 715 So. 2d 866, 869 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997) (ordering expert psychiatric assistance for an 
indigent defendant in an assault case by citing Isom , apparently erroneously, as precedent). 
 81. See, e.g., Williams v. Newsome, 334 S.E.2d 171, 172 (Ga. 1985) (considering whether Ake 
applies to noncapital cases but dismissing the defendant’s claim for assistance on other grounds); 
Watson v. State, 658 N.E.2d 579, 582 (Ind. 1995) (referring to Justice Berger’s concurrence, stating 
“While it may be considered an open question whether Ake applies to non-capital cases, we 
nonetheless conclude that the Ake requirement was satisfied here”). 
 82. State v. Barnett provides the most thorough analysis by a state court arguing for the extension 
of Ake to noncapital cases. 909 S.W.2d 423 (Tenn. 1995). In Barnett, the Supreme Court of Tennessee 
applied Ake to a noncapital murder case and stated, “We agree with the jurisdictions that have applied 
the Ake principle in the non-capital context because the due process principle of fundamental fairness 
requires that a State which prosecutes an indigent defendant assure that defendant of a fair opportunity 
to present his defense.” Id. at 428. See also  State v. Edwards, 868 S.W.2d 682, 697 (Crim. App. Tenn. 
1993) (“Constitutional due process . . . applies [regardless of] whether the death penalty is sought.”).  
 This decision effectively overrules Tennesee’s past position that Ake was limited to capital cases 
on which opponents of extension had previously relied as heavily as they continue to rely on Alabama 
law. See State v. Harris, 866 S.W.2d 583, 585 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992); State v. Evans, 710 S.W.2d 
530, 534 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1986). 
 83. See Elmore v. State, 968 S.W.2d 462, 465-66 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (applying the Ake test 
to a case involving a driving while intoxicated charge); De Freece v. State, 848 S.W.2d 150, 156 n.5 
(Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (“This Court does not understand the holding of Ake to be limited to the 
context of capital offenses.”). 
 84. In Husske v. Commonwealth , the Court of Appeals of Virginia instructed, “Although Ake 
involved a prosecution for capital murder, nothing in the Court’s discussion of the ‘the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s due process guarantee of fundamental fairness,’ the basic underpinning of the rule 
announced in Ake, suggests that the holding in Ake is limited to capital murder cases.” 448 S.E.2d 331, 
334 (Va. Ct. App. 1994). 
 85. See, e.g., Bannister v. State, 726 S.W.2d 821, 827-28 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (stating that the 
defendant has raised an issue that the judges “consider only because this is a capital case”).  
 86. See, e.g., Dirickson v. State, 953 S.W.2d 55, 57 (Ark. 1997); People v. Kegley, 529 N.E.2d 
1118, 1121 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988); State v. Vale, 519 N.Y.S.2d 4, 6-8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987). 
 87. See Armontrout, 835 F.2d at 1243; Husske, 448 S.E.2d at 337. 
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situation are those states that have not addressed Ake’s scope but repeatedly 
announce the Ake holding only in terms of indigent capital defendants.88 
Both the courts’ strict and liberal tendencies may shed some light on the 
states’ likelihood of extending Ake to noncapital cases.89 
3. State Assistance Statutes 
Finally, the source of the most conflict among states involves their state 
assistance statutes. The statutes range from those that specifically provide for 
expert assistance to indigent defendants in noncapital as well as capital 
cases,90 to those that specifically limit such assistance to capital cases,91 and 
lastly to those that do not address the scope issue at all.92 The latter category 
 
 
 88. See State v. Hood, 422 S.E.2d 679, 683 (N.C. 1992) (determining “that Ake applies to both 
the guilt phase and the sentencing proceeding in a capital case.”); State v. Peeples, 640 N.E.2d 208, 
211 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (“The United States Supreme Court in Ake v. Oklahoma held that in a 
capital case where the defendant raises the insanity defense, the state must provide expert psychiatric 
assistance so as to provide the indigent defendant with the basic tools of defense.”) (citations omitted); 
Fitzgerald v. State, 972 P.2d 1157, 1169 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998) (“Ake held that a capital defendant 
was entitled to expert assistance where the State presents psychiatric evidence of his fut ure 
dangerousness.”); Commonwealth v. Miller, 746 A.2d 592, 600 (Pa. 2000) (“In Commonwealth v. 
Christy, relying on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Ake v. Oklahoma, this Court held that a 
capital defendant is entitled to state-paid psychiatric assistance only where the assistance is needed to 
rebut the prosecution’s argument of future dangerousness, not to prove mitigating circumstances.”) 
(citations omitted).  
 89. However, it should be noted that even in those jurisdictions that have followed either of the 
two extreme approaches, inconsistency in application has been prevalent. Reliance on trends in 
applying Ake in other contexts should be viewed as only loosely indicative of that jurisdiction’s overall 
views of Ake’s scope. 
 90. See COLO.  REV.  STAT.  ANN.  § 18-1-403 (1999) (providing that all indigent defendants 
charged with any crime may apply for all resources for their defense pursuant to other Title 21 
requirements); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.216 (1999) (providing for one psychiatric expert to any indigent 
defendant charged with any crime). 
 91. See ARIZ.  REV. STAT. ANN.  § 13-4013(B) (1956); CAL. PENAL CODE  § 987.9 (West Supp. 
2001) (limiting its reach to capital cases and indigent defendants who have been convicted of first or 
second degree murder and have served a prison term); 725 ILL. COMP . STAT. 5/113-3(d) (2000). 
 92. See HAW.  REV.  STAT.  ANN. § 802-7 (Michie 1999); KAN.  STAT.  ANN.  § 22-4508 (West 
Supp. 1995); MICH . COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.20(a) (West Supp. 2001); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 7.135 
(Michie 2000); N.H. REV.  STAT. ANN.  § 604-A:6 (West Supp. 2000); N.C. GEN. STAT.  § 7A-454 
(2000); OR.  REV. STAT.  § 135.055 (1999); WASH.  REV.  CODE § 10.77.020 (2001). One should note, 
however, that the New Hampshire Supreme Court consistently interprets its statute to apply to 
noncapital cases. See State v. Stow, 620 A.2d 1023, 1027 (N.H. 1993) (applying the statute in a 
kidnapping and aggravated felonious assault case); In re Allen R., 506 A.2d 329, 332 (N.H. 1986) 
(applying the statute in a juvenile delinquency hearing). Similarly, Kansas and Oregon courts have 
applied their respective statutes in noncapital cases although the scope issue was not addressed in those 
cases. See State v. Snodgrass, 843 P.2d 720, 729 (Kan. 1992) (applying the statute in a case involving 
aggravated kidnapping, aggravated sodomy, and aggravated assault charges); State v. Grauerholz, 654 
P.2d 395, 399 (Kan. 1982) (applying the statute in a felony theft case); State v. Gage, 806 P.2d 1159, 
1160-61 (Or. App. 1991) (applying the statute to a driving while intoxicated case); State v. 
Underwood, 756 P.2d 72, 73-74 (Or. App. 1988) (applying the statute to a driving while intoxicated 
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is by far the most common. Furthermore, some state assistance statutes do 
not specifically mention expert assistance at all.93  
Courts need not follow the limitations of state assistance statutes when 
adjudicating an indigent defendant’s claim for expert assistance. 
Constitutional principles require that courts also evaluate such claims, when 
appropriately presented, under a due process, equal protection, or Sixth 
Amendment standard.94 Specifically, Ake examines and applies Oklahoma’s 
assistance statute in this constitutional context. However, these vast 
disparities among state statutes may undermine the principles upon which 
Ake is based. Bringing constitutional claims can be an intensive, 
cumbersome, and lengthy process that is much more difficult and less 
efficient than bringing claims based on clear state assistance statutes.95 
III. ANALYSIS OF THE PROPER APPLICATION OF AKE TO 
NONCAPITAL CASES  
The dangers of the prevalent irregularities in federal and state common 
law and among state assistance statutes are abundant and glaring. When 
legislative and judicial lawmakers apply a constitutional standard in such 
 
 
case).  
 93. See ALA. CODE § 15-12-21 (Lexis Supp. 1999); IOWA CODE § 813.2 (West 2000); KY. REV. 
STAT.  ANN. §§ 31.070, 31.110 (Banks-Baldwin 2000); MASS. GEN.  LAWS ch. 261, § 27C (2000); 
MISS.  CODE ANN.  § 99-15-17 (2000); N.M. STAT. ANN.  § 31-16-2 (Michie 2000); S.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 17-3-80 (LAW. CO-OP. 2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-40-8 (Michie 1988); TENN.  CODE ANN. 
§ 40-14-207 (1997); TEX. CRIM. P ROC. CODE ANN. § 26.05(A) (Vernon 2001); W. VA. CODE § 29-21-
14 (1999).  
 However, despite the lack of language specifically addressing expert assistance, many of these 
states’ courts have interpreted the “costs” concept of their respective statutes to include providing 
reimbursement for expert assistance and have done so without reference to Ake. See, e.g., Dubose v. 
State, 662 So. 2d 1156, 1176 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993); Dillingham v. Commonwealth, 995 S.W.2d 377, 
381-82 (Ky. 1999).  
 The Tennessee provision specifically allows much greater latitude in granting other resources for 
indigent capital defendants’ defense than those for noncapital defendants. By contrast, the Texas 
statute has been interpreted to allow the provision of a wide variety of expert assistance in an equally 
wide range of criminal trials. See Guy Goldberg & Gena Bunn, Balancing Fairness & Finality: A 
Comprehensive Review of the Texas Death Penalty, 5 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 49, 98-99 (2000).  
 94. See, e.g., State v. Barnett, 909 S.W.2d 423, 426 (Tenn. 1995); State v. Harris, 866 S.W.2d 
583, 585 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). Due process, the primary basis for the Ake decision, is the most 
often cited constitutional provision for such claims. See supra  note 47.  
 95. For an argument that individual state constitution principles are most appropriately relied 
upon when deciding the validity of criminal procedure issues, see William J. Brennan, State 
Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV.  L. REV. 489, 504 (1977); Barry 
Friedman, Pas de Deux: The Supreme Court and the Habeas Courts, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2467, 2498 
(1993). Additionally, the infrequent use of the Ake doctrine on the federal level due to the broad scope 
of the Criminal Justice Act demonstrates the ease of relying on statutory expert assistance schemes 
rather than bringing constitutional claims. See supra  note 51.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss3/6
p951 McGraw.doc  2/28/2002   5:10 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
2001] RIGHT TO EXPERT ASSISTANCE 967 
 
 
 
 
disparate manners, great injustice, unpredictability, and abuse of discretion 
surely follow. Consistent application of Ake in capital and noncaptial cases 
would rectify some of these injustices.  
A. The Broad Language of Ake 
The language of Ake itself, although applied in the capital context, in no 
way limits its test to capital cases. First, the general right to access principles 
on which the Ake Court relied refer to applications in criminal proceedings 
and to criminal defendants in broad terms. There is no indication that the 
principles might only apply to some criminal cases or to a certain class of 
criminal defendants.96 Additionally, the Court refers to an indigent criminal 
defendant’s potential loss of “liberty” rather than the loss of “life” that would 
be more consistent with an intention to limit its scope to capital cases.97  
Furthermore, the Ake Court based its arguments on precedent that drew 
no distinction between capital and noncapital cases. Of the eight cases that 
the Ake Court cited to support its general indigent defendants’ rights 
principles,98 only one was actually a capital case.99 Moreover, the capital case 
 
 
 96. The Court made many references to criminal proceedings in general without qualifying those 
references by limiting the class of indigent criminal defendants to whom the references apply. For 
example, the Court stated, “This Court has long recognized that when a State brings its judicial power 
to bear on an indigent defendant in a criminal proceeding, it must take steps to assure that the 
defendant has a fair opportunity to present his defense.” Ake, 470 U.S. at 68, 76 (emphasis added). 
Additionally, the Court instructed, “[A] criminal trial is fundamentally unfair if the State proceeds 
against an indigent defendant without making certain that he has access to the raw materials integral to 
the building of an effective defense.” Id. at 77 (emphasis added).  
 The Court did use the term “capital sentencing proceeding” when evaluating the defendant’s 
compelling interest aspect of the test. Id. at 83. However, the Court did not indicate that the threat of a 
heavy noncapital sentence would be any less compelling. 
 97. The Court stated, “This elementary principle . . . derives from the belief that justice cannot be 
equal where, simply as a result of his poverty, a defendant is denied the opportunity to participate 
meaningfully in a judicial proceeding in which his liberty is at stake.” Id. at 76 (emphasis added). “The 
private interest in the accuracy of a criminal proceeding that places an individual’s life or liberty at risk 
is almost uniquely compelling.” Id. at 78 (emphasis added). 
 98. See id. at 76. The Court cited the following cases in a general explanation of its right to 
access principles: Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984) (requiring that assistance of counsel must be effective); Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981) 
(involving the right to blood tests in a ‘quasi-criminal’ paternity action); McMann v. Richardson, 397 
U.S. 759 (1970) (involving effectiveness of assistance of counsel); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 
335 (1963) (involving the right to counsel at trial); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) 
(involving the right to counsel on the first direct appeal as of right); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 
(1959) (involving waived filing fees upon appeal); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (involving 
the right to a trial transcript upon appeal). For a general discussion of many of these historical cases, 
see supra Part II.A. 
 99. See supra  note 98. Of the eight cases upon which the Ake Court relied, only Strickland 
involved a capital defendant. See 466 U.S. at 675. 
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cited by the Court does not limit its holding to only capital cases.100 Finally, 
the Ake Court phrased its test broadly, presumably to include all indigent 
criminal defendants.101 
Opponents of Ake’s extension to noncapital cases cite Justice Burger’s 
concurring statement that “[n]othing in the Court’s opinion reaches 
noncapital cases”102 as an explanation of the Court’s intended scope. 
However, Justice Burger’s concurrence is purely a statement of his view of 
the holding’s scope, which is proposed without extensive analysis of the 
issue and which is joined by no other Justice.103 Furthermore, Justice 
Rehnquist’s dissenting opinion stated that “the constitutional rule announced 
by the Court is far too broad”104 and that he “would limit the rule to capital 
cases,”105 thereby implying that the majority did not place such a limitation 
on the holding’s scope. This statement indicates that Justice Burger’s view 
was not universally held by the Court. Therefore, beyond the fact that Ake 
was a capital case, there is little evidence that the Ake Court intended to limit 
its holding to capital cases. 
B. Furtherance of Constitutional Provisions 
The application of the Ake standard to noncapital cases furthers the 
constitutional principles upon which right to access cases are founded. These 
principles, as well as the statutory and common law implementation of these 
principles, have been consistently applied to all criminal defendants 
regardless of the crimes they committed. 
Courts have based the landmark cases that define indigent criminal 
defendants’ rights to access to courts106 on the guiding principles of the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.107 They have long applied these principles to all people 
regardless of race, religion, gender, sexual orientation, physical ability, and 
 
 
 100. Id. at 697-98. 
 101. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 102. Ake, 470 U.S. at 87 (Burger, J., concurring). 
 103. Justice Burger presented only one brief justification for his view of the holding’s scope. “The 
facts of the case and the question presented confine[d] the actual holding of the Court. In capital cases 
the finality of the sentence imposed warrants protections that may or may not be required in other 
cases.” Id. Furthermore, his use of the phrase “may or may not” indicates uneasiness with the stark 
distinction between capital and noncapital cases.  
 104. Ake, 470 U.S. at 87 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 105. Id. 
 106. See supra Part II.A and notes 22-29. 
 107. See supra note 11. 
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wealth.108 These principles ensure that all citizens are treated with the same 
respect and have the same rights as their neighbors and that their lives and 
liberty are not unfairly deprived when governmental action is at issue. 
Specifically, these principles guarantee that all citizens have equal access to 
our courts and receive equal protection of their liberty, as well as their lives, 
in judicial proceedings. 
Additionally, the drafters of the Criminal Justice Act of 1964 recognized 
the importance of these principles for all indigent criminal defendants.109 The 
Act specifically applies to all persons who are charged with felonies, 
misdemeanors, and in some instances, those seeking habeas corpus relief in 
federal courts.110 This pre-Ake implementation indicates at least a 
congressional understanding that such expert assistance was crucial to the 
full and fair defense of all indigent defendants who could meet a particular 
threshold showing of both financial need and the necessity of an expert on 
the federal criminal level. Courts should apply the Ake test equally as broad 
on the state level and on the federal level for situations to which the Act does 
not apply.111 
Finally, courts apply due process and equal protection concerns, like other 
constitutional principles and the vast majority of criminal procedures, to all 
criminal defendants in the same manner, regardless of the crime with which 
they are charged.112 Accordingly, constitutional principles and their equal 
 
 
 108. For a general discussion of the application of these principles in the criminal procedure 
context, see NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra  note 11. 
 109. See supra  note 30. Although all indigent criminal defendants are not eligible to receive 
counsel and other services under the Act, the Act grants assistance to defendants in eight broad 
categories and allows judicial discretion to provide assistance to defendants who do not fit within one 
of those categories when “the court determines that the interests of justice so require.” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3006A(a) (1994). 
 110. See supra  note 30. Congress has heavily amended the Act during its thirty-six-year existence 
to achieve its current broad scope. However, the history surrounding the original version indicates that 
Congress specifically intended the Act to aid financially needy persons with a broad range of legal 
needs. See Criminal Justice Act: Hearing on H.R. 1027, 3446, 3504, 4156, 4816, 5330, 5545, 5881, 
5889, 6250, 6499, 6765 Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 32 (1963) 
(statement of Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney General) (referring to the “nearly 10,000 persons, more 
than 30 percent of the total defendants in Federal criminal cases” that require such assistance); id. at 36 
(letter from Robert F. Kennedy to President John F. Kennedy) (referring to the President’s desire to 
assure counsel and resources to “every man accused of crime in Federal court, regardless of his 
means”); Criminal Justice Act of 1963: Hearings on S. 63, 1057 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 
88th Cong. 32-33 (1963) (statement of William P. Rogers, former Attorney General); id. at 205 (report 
of the Attorney General’s Comm. on Poverty and the Administration of Federal Criminal Justice). But 
see Hearing on H.R. 1027  at 62 (statement of Representative Whitener opposing provision of expert 
services).  
 111. See supra note 30. 
 112. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 11; McCord, supra note 74. 
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application to all criminal defendants also mandate an extension of Ake to 
noncapital indigent defendants. 
C. Judicial Efficiency and Uniformity Concerns 
Different applications of Ake among the courts and legislatures result in 
vast inconsistencies in indigent defendants’ trials. As a result, a noncapital 
indigent defendant’s ability to adequately defend himself now depends on the 
federal or state jurisdiction in which the charges against him lie.113 
Additionally, the opponents of applying Ake to noncapital cases argue that 
the expansion will drastically increase states’ costs in funding the defense of 
indigent criminal defendants and that courts will grant such expert assistance 
in ridiculous circumstances,114 primarily due to the fact that the test strongly 
favors individual interests over those of the community.115 However, this 
extreme hypothetical situation is not a realistic effect of Ake’s application to 
noncapital cases.  
First, although the states’ interest in maintaining an affordable indigent 
defendant defense system is valid, this interest should never outweigh the 
interest of the individual in having a full and fair defense. Additionally, the 
expense of potentially extensive prison terms resulting from noncapital cases 
might easily outweigh any savings from withholding expert assistance in 
such cases.116 
Second, the Ake test itself has the flexibility to take the state’s fiscal 
concerns into consideration. Under the Ake standard, courts will not grant 
expert assistance for frivolous requests because the factors117 have the 
flexibility to account for the level of need and potential punishment.118 The 
 
 
 113. For example, under the current conditions of state common law, an indigent defendant 
charged with rape in Virginia would have an opportunity to attempt to pass the Ake test to receive a 
DNA expert. However, that same defendant would not have such an opportunity in Alabama when 
charged with the same crime and would therefore not have access to the DNA expert. See supra  notes 
79-84. 
 114. Specifically, opponents argue that only defendants’ life interest in capital cases would 
outweigh the government’s interest in conserving its funds. See Devlin, supra note 17. 
 115. For a discussion of the view that the original Mathews Due Process test in general, and 
specifically the refinement applied by the Ake Court in the criminal context, undervalues the 
community’s interests, see Koch, supra note 41, at 657 n.22. 
 116. For a concise discussion of the relationship between the cost of providing expert assistance to 
the cost of extended imprisonment, see Devlin, supra note 17. 
 117. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 118. For example, if an indigent defendant in an auto theft case requests the assistance of a jury 
selection expert, the Ake balancing test would likely show that his or her interest in receiving this aid is 
outweighed by the government’s interest in conserving its funds. First, the potential punishment in 
such a case is comparatively low. Second, such an expert is not crucial for the presentation of the basic 
elements of the defense of the crime. Finally, the cost imposed on the government is high compared to 
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primary need for expert assistance is to respond to the prosecution’s 
damaging expert testimony.119 It is highly unlikely that the prosecution will 
spend state funds on irrelevant expert assistance that does not go to a key 
factor in the trial. With proper application of the Ake test, courts will only 
grant expert assistance to those noncapital defendants to whom an expert’s 
testimony is most integral to their defense and who face the greatest loss 
without that testimony. Aren’t these exactly the indigent criminal defendants 
about whom our criminal justice system should be most concerned?  
IV. PROPOSAL 
Extending Ake to noncapital cases and codifying this extension in state 
assistance statutes is consistent with the language in Ake, furthers the 
principles on which the right to access cases are based, and complies with 
notions of judicial efficiency. The repercussions from the inconsistency 
among the various courts and legislatures in their application of Ake to 
noncapital cases are vast and numerous. The disparity ensures that from state 
to state and federal district to federal district, indigent criminal defendants 
will have very different abilities to defend themselves against potential losses 
of liberty.  
First, both federal and state courts must consistently provide all indigent 
criminal defendants the opportunity to attempt to pass the Ake three-part test. 
Second, and arguably more importantly, this uniform application to 
noncapital defendants must be codified as a further safeguard against the 
undue loss of liberty. 
State assistance statutes that clearly apply to noncapital defendants ensure 
that destitute defendants will not have to face the taxing burden of sustaining 
an Ake constitutional claim120 to receive expert assistance. Normalization of 
state assistance statutes might be the most realistic and effective mechanism 
for ensuring the consistent application of Ake to noncapital cases. State 
assistance statutes are a familiar, accessible method for guaranteeing that 
basic constitutional rights, such as access to expert assistance, are applied in 
practice on the state criminal justice level.121  
Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court could further solidify the law on this 
 
 
any potential benefits to the defendant. 
 For a discussion of the choice of a nonpsychiatric expert for this illustration, see supra note 17. 
For examples of Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals cases that applied the Ake three-part test but denied 
the requested assistance, see supra note 66. 
 119. See supra note 14. 
 120. See supra Part II.C.3. 
 121. See supra note 95. 
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issue by granting certiorari for a noncapital case from one of the jurisdictions 
that has debated this issue and declaring that the Ake rule applies to all 
indigent criminal defendants who can satisfy the burden of the test. This dual 
scheme would ensure a fair, consistent application of the Ake rule and further 
the constitutional principles on which the decision was based. 
CONCLUSION 
The constitutional mandates of the Due Process Clause, the Equal 
Protection Clause, and the Sixth Amendment, as well as prudential concerns, 
require that courts apply the Ake v. Oklahoma test to noncapital as well as 
capital defendants. Finally, although this Note focuses on Ake’s application 
to noncapital cases, there are numerous other areas in which the application 
of Ake varies among jurisdictions and which should be examined by future 
courts, legislatures, and legal commentators. The legal community should 
soon discuss expansion of the doctrine into civil cases—cases in which the 
defendant does not dwell below but rather near the poverty line—and cases 
in which DNA and other new technological experts are integral to an 
adequate defense. For now, however, an assurance that noncapital indigent 
defendants have access to expert assistance under the Ake doctrine is a 
crucial step in guaranteeing that all indigent criminal defendants possess the 
“basic tools of an adequate defense.”122 
Amber J. McGraw* 
 
 
 122. Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227 (1971). 
 *  B.A. Biology (1999), University of Kansas; J.D. Candidate (2002), Washington University 
School of Law. 
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